Security analysis of the Chinese web: how well is it protected? by Chen, Ping et al.
Security Analysis of the Chinese Web:
How well is it protected?
Ping Chen†, Nick Nikiforakis‡, Lieven Desmet†, Christophe Huygens†
†iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
†{firstname.lastname}@cs.kuleuven.be
‡Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University
‡nick@cs.stonybrook.edu
ABSTRACT
As the web rapidly expands and gets integrated into the
daily lives of more and more people, so does the number
of cyber attacks against it. To defend against attackers,
website operators can utilize a wide range of defense mech-
anisms, both at the server-side, as well as the client-side of
their web applications. From a security-metrics standpoint,
the presence or absence of these mechanisms can be used as
a security indicator of any given website.
In this paper, through a large-scale analysis of the 10,000
most popular Chinese websites, we analyze the security of
the Chinese web by investigating the usage of client-side
security policies, and evaluating the discovered HTTPS im-
plementations. We show that, when compared to popular
websites of the rest of the world, a significant fraction of Chi-
nese websites lag behind on the adoption of good security
practices. Among other findings, we report on the fact that
6% of websites inadvertently leak private user information,
such as Chinese identity numbers, by placing spreadsheet
files with sensitive content in directories indexed by search
engines.
1. INTRODUCTION
The web becomes more and more popular and important
in China, with more than 1.47 million websites on the Chi-
nese web and 44% Chinese people (591 million) using it as of
July 2013 [17]. While Chinese Internet users enjoy the con-
venience and flexibility that the web brings them, and Chi-
nese companies heavily depend on the web for their business
operations, at the same time, the web also draws increasing
attention from attackers.
In December 2011, Chinese hackers leaked six million user
accounts from csdn.net (website of Chinese software devel-
oper network), and 40 million user accounts from tianya.cn
(the largest Chinese online forum) [5]. Over 20 million hotel
reservation records containing customers’ private informa-
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tion were leaked on the Chinese web in December 2013 [1],
and more than seven thousand vulnerabilities found in Chi-
nese websites were reported in 2013 [12]. These incidents
raise concerns about the security of Chinese web, and show
that even high-profile websites such as csdn.net can be com-
promised.
As people depend more and more on the web for their
daily lives and businesses, it may be desirable for govern-
ment and supervisory organizations to continuously assess
and monitor the security of the web environment. Such an
assessment typically involves a large number of websites be-
longing to a country, or a specific industry sector, and hence
it has to be done externally for e ciency, since traditional in-
ternal penetration testing and code reviewing for each web-
site is time and labor consuming. Recently, Van Goethem et
al. [30] conducted a security assessment for more than 22,000
European websites, and proposed a score system to com-
pare di↵erent websites’ security levels, showing that such a
large-scale security analysis of the web is achievable, albeit
challenging.
In this paper, we apply the same basic methodology to
investigate the security of the Chinese web through a large-
scale experiment. Instead of searching for vulnerabilities
and weaknesses, we seek to discover the usage of defense
mechanisms by Chinese websites, trying to answer the ques-
tion “How well is the Chinese web protected?” In particular,
we focus on client-side security policies, and HTTPS imple-
mentations, both of which can be passively detected. These
mechanisms are developed by the security community for se-
curing the web, thus the presence of these mechanisms on a
website can be used as an indicator of the security awareness
and practices of that website.
Our main contributions are the following: (1) We report
the usage of client-side security policies in the top 10,000
Chinese websites, and compare it to the statistics obtained
from non-Chinese websites, showing that the Chinese web
lags behind with respect to the adoption of client-side secu-
rity policies; (2) We provide a comprehensive evaluation of
HTTPS implementations on the Chinese web, illustrating
that the majority of HTTPS adopters do not have secure
and protected HTTPS implementations; (3) We present a
case study on the inadvertent private data leakage, showing
that 6% of websites leak Chinese identity numbers, that are
collected in spreadsheet files and can be obtained by search
engines.
2. DATA COLLECTION
2.1 Website selection
According to the status report published by China Inter-
net Network Information Center (CNNIC) in 2013, there are
1.47 million websites on the Chinese web [17]. Since check-
ing the whole content of all websites on the Chinese web
is close to infeasible due to its large size and registration
walls, we focus on the high-profile websites that are ranked
in Alexa’s list of most popular websites.
Starting with Alexa’s list of top 1 million sites, we first
select the set of .cn domains from the list. Next, we cross-
check top.chinaz.com, a website providing a ranked list
consisting of more than 6,000 Chinese websites, in order to
identify the set of Chinese websites not using .cn domain
(e.g., baidu.com, qq.com) in Alexa’s list. As a result, we
obtain a set of more than 12,000 Chinese websites.
We then filter out the websites without an ICP (Inter-
net Content Provider) license. The ICP license is a permit
issued by the Chinese government to permit China-based
websites to operate. Websites operating in China without
an ICP license will be fined or shut down as specified by Chi-
nese Internet regulations. By removing websites without an
ICP license from our dataset, we try to avoid the inclusion
of some malicious websites involved in illegal online activi-
ties, such as phishing and porn websites. After this filtering
step, we obtained about 10,000 websites as our targets, to
represent the high-profile part of the Chinese web.
2.2 Crawling experiment
In order to assess the security of the top 10,000 Chinese
websites, we conducted a crawling experiment to visit the
popular webpages from these websites. For each website, we
obtain up to 200 webpage URLs by using the Bing Search
API [4] with parameters site:domain and Market:zh-cn.
For instance, the search for site:baidu.com Market:zh-cn
in Bing will return a set of Chinese webpages belonging to
baidu.com. By setting the parameter Market:zh-cn, we in-
struct Bing to only search for Simplified Chinese webpages
originating from Mainland China, while excluding any En-
glish or Traditional Chinese webpages that are not targeting
users in Mainland China.
After the webpage URLs are obtained, we use a crawler
built on top of HtmlUnit [6], i.e., a headless scriptable browser,
to visit each URL. By loading every webpage within HtmlU-
nit and with an appropriately set user-agent, we mimicked
the behavior of a regular user visiting a website with an In-
ternet Explorer browser, which is the typical case in China.
In total, we analyzed more than 1.4 million webpages for the
top 10,000 Chinese websites, with an average of 147 web-
pages per website.
For a comparison analysis, we collected a set of 10,000
non-Chinese websites, and launched the same crawling ex-
periment for these non-Chinese websites. The set of non-
Chinese websites was collected as follows: for each Chinese
website included in our study, we randomly select a non-
Chinese website with the closest rank from Alexa’s top 1
million sites. For example, yahoo.com (rank 4) is selected
as it is the closest neighbor of baidu.com (rank 5).
3. USAGE OF CLIENT-SIDE SECURITY
POLICIES
Client-side security policies are declarative security mech-
anisms, whereby a website communicates its intent and leaves
it up to the browsers to enforce it. There are a number of
benefits to the use of client-side security policies [19], with
auditability being one of them. Client-side security poli-
cies are typically sent via HTTP response headers, thus it
is straightforward to determine a website’s security expec-
tations by passive analysis.
By instructing browsers to enforce protection through server-
provided policies, websites can address a number of secu-
rity issues in a very straightforward manner. Today, several
client-side security policies exist, all of which address various
security issues such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and click-
jacking attacks. Although these policies are not security
panacea, their usage on a website can indicate the “security
consciousness” of that website and its security objectives.
3.1 Client-side security policies
HTTP-only Cookies First introduced in Internet Explorer
(IE) 6 SP1, the HttpOnly attribute is designed to mitigate
the risk of malicious client-side scripts accessing sensitive
cookie values. Cookies are accessible to JavaScript code by
default, which allows attackers to steal the cookies via an
XSS attack. Using the HttpOnly attribute in a Set-Cookie
header restrict the access of that cookie to the HTTP(S) pro-
tocol, making it inaccessible to client-side JavaScript [14].
Content Security Policy (CSP) CSP provides a stan-
dard HTTP response header (Content-Security-Policy)
that allows a webpage to declare approved sources of con-
tent that browsers should be allowed to load on that spe-
cific page. Whenever a requested resource originates from
a source that is not defined in the CSP, it will simply not
be loaded [28]. For example, if the policy does not allow
in-line JavaScript, then, even if an attacker is able to inject
malicious JavaScript in the webpage, the injected code will
not be executed. CSP is mainly designed to mitigate data
injection vulnerabilities, although it can also help mitigating
mixed-content attacks [15]. CSP is a W3C candidate as of
2012 [29], and almost all modern browsers support it.
X-Frame-Options The HTTP response header X-Frame-
Options is designed to mitigate Clickjacking attacks [26]. In
a Clickjacking attack, the attacker redresses the user inter-
face of website A with transparent layers, and then trick the
user into clicking on a button on an embed page from web-
site B when they were intending to click on the the same
place of the overlaying page from website A. To stop Click-
jacking attacks, the X-Frame-Options header can be used to
instruct a user’s browser whether a certain page is allowed
to be embedded in a frame. For example, if the X-Frame-
Options header’s value is DENY, then the browser will prevent
the page from rendering when embedded within a frame.
X-Content-Type-Options Microsoft’s IE has a MIME-
sni ng feature that will attempt to determine the content-
type for each downloaded resource. This feature, however,
can lead to security problems for servers hosting untrusted
content, since attackers can craft malicious files abusing the
sni ng feature in IE. To prevent IE from MIME-sni ng,
thus reducing exposure to attacks, a web server can send the
X-Content-Type-Options header with the nosniff value.
3.2 Findings and discussion
Table 1 gives an overview of the usage of client-side se-
curity policies on the Chinese web. HTTP-only cookies are
much more widely used than other policies, and their usage
on Chinese websites is greater than that of non-Chinese web-
sites. The X-Frame-Options and X-Content-Type-Options
header are much less popular, and their usage on the Chi-
nese web is lower than the estimated global statistics. For
CSP, the adoption both on the Chinese web and globally
is quite low, most likely due to the relative newness of the
mechanism.
Since client-side security policies rely on a browser’s en-
forcement, it is important to supply the browser with a cor-
rect policy. In our experiment, we found 5 Chinese websites
using the X-Frame-Options header with an incorrect value,
e.g., SAMEORIGIN/DENY, which is e↵ectively ignored by the
browser. Overall, the adoption of client-side security poli-
cies on the Chinese web is low, which indicates that a lot
Chinese websites lag behind with respect to adopting coun-
termeasures on the client side.
By analyzing the rank of websites using client-side security
policies, we found that there is no strong correlation between
a website’s popularity and its adoption of client-side security
policies, as shown in Figure 1. The figure also shows the
distribution of Chinese websites with HTTPS implemented,
which will be discussed in next section.
4. SECURITY OF HTTPS
IMPLEMENTATIONS
The HTTPS protocol is the standard solution for secur-
ing web tra c, which guarantees the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of web communications by adding the security capa-
bilities of SSL/TLS to HTTP. It also provides website au-
thenticity with the CA/B (Certificate Authority/Browser)
trust model. While HTTPS is designed to provide strong
security, it may fail to achieve the desired security goals if
it is implemented in the wrong way. A range of security
issues associated with HTTPS have, over the time, been
discovered, ranging from cryptographic weaknesses and de-
sign flaws in SSL/TLS protocol, to the insecure design of
HTTPS websites, and bad coding practices [16].
When migrating to HTTPS, websites should try to avoid
known security issues, and consider to add extra defenses to
HTTPS. In this section, we assess a website’s HTTPS imple-
mentation in two ways: (1) the presence of known security
issues related to HTTPS; (2) the usage of extra client-side
security policies for the better enforcement of HTTPS.
Note that when discussing HTTPS security, we use the
active network attacker model. An active network attacker
positions himself on a network between the host running
the web browser and the web server, and is able to inter-
cept and tamper with the network tra c passing by. The
attacker can read, modify, delete, and inject HTTP requests
and responses, but he is typically not able to decipher any
encrypted information.
4.1 HTTPS security issues
To build a secure HTTPS website, there are a number of
security pitfalls that websites should try to avoid. In this
section, we check whether an HTTPS website su↵ers from
the following security issues: Insecure SSL/TLS Imple-
mentation As the core part of HTTPS, secure SSL/TLS
implementation is critical to HTTPS websites. In our as-
sessment, we use an SSL scanner called sslyze [9] to search
for the following security issues related to SSL/TLS: broken
certificate validation chain (e.g. untrusted CA), support of
insecure SSL 2.0, use of weak ciphers (e.g. export-grade
ciphers with small encryption key length), and the vulner-
ability to insecure renegotiation attacks [11], and CRIME
attacks [25]. This assessment is similar to Qualys’ SSL sur-
vey for the global SSL landscape. According to Qualys’ data
in March 2014, more than 75% the tested HTTPS websites
su↵er from insecure SSL/TLS implementations [8].
Post-to-HTTPS Forms It is a relatively common practice
in many HTTPS websites to provide a form (such as a login
box) on an HTTP page while arranging for any sensitive in-
formation to be submitted over HTTPS. This, however, is a
bad practice, since an active network attacker can launch an
SSL-stripping attack to steal a user’s sensitive data without
raising the user’s suspicion [23].
Mixed-content Inclusion When migrating to HTTPS,
many websites fail to fully update their applications, result-
ing in mixed-content inclusion, which can render the HTTPS
protection useless [15]. Mixed-content inclusion occurs when
the main webpage is sent over a secure HTTPS channel,
while some additional content included on that page, such
as images and scripts, are delivered over non-secured HTTP
connections. As a result, an active network attacker can still
try to compromise an HTTPS website by intercepting and
modifying the unencrypted content.
4.2 Client-side security policies for HTTPS
websites
In addition to the client-side security policies discussed
in Section 3, HTTPS websites can also make use of the
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security policy and the Secure
attribute of cookies. These mechanisms are specifically de-
signed for HTTPS websites and can be used to mitigate some
HTTPS-specific security issues.
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) HSTS is de-
signed to mainly prevent SSL-stripping attacks where a se-
cure HTTPS connection is downgraded to a plain HTTP
connection by the attacker. Set by a website via a HTTP
response header field (Strict-Transport-Security), HSTS
specifies a period of time during which the user’s browser is
instructed that all requests to that website need to be sent
over HTTPS, regardless of what a user requests. The HSTS
Policy helps protecting website users against both passive
eavesdropping, as well as active Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attacks.
Secure Cookies HTTPS websites should set the Secure at-
tribute when sending cookies to a user’s browser, which can
prevent cookies from being intercepted by an active network
attacker. Although the tra c between a web server and a
browser is encrypted when using HTTPS, the cookies stored
in the browser are not, by default, limited to an HTTPS
context. Thus an active network attacker can intercept any
outbound HTTP request from the browser and redirect that
request to the same website over HTTP in order to reveal the
cookies [14]. By setting the Secure attribute, the scope of a
cookie is limited to secure channels, thus stopping browsers
from sending cookies over unencrypted HTTP requests.
Security mechanisms % of Non-Chinese
websites
% of Chinese
websites
Example findings
HTTP-only Cookies 25.7% 43% JSESSIONID=+8OuWN7rO7G
nE3Ag$dXHpvH8h4rVHLauth
; HttpOnly (alipay.com)
Content Security Policy 0.06% 0.01% script-src *.zhihu.com
*.google-analytics.com
‘unsafe-eval’ (zhihu.com)
X-Frame-Options 5.8% 1.2% DENY (weibo.com)
X-Content-Type-Options 4.6% 0.5% nosniff (alibaba.com)
Table 1: Usage of client-side security policies on the Chinese web
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Figure 1: Distribution of websites using client-side security policies over rank ranges
4.3 Findings and discussion
In order to identify HTTPS pages from the 10,000 web-
sites, we try to enumerate HTTPS URLs for each web-
site. First, we select HTTPS URLs obtained from Bing
(as described in Section 2). Additionally, we search for
any HTTPS links on HTTP webpages during our crawl-
ing experiment, and add these HTTPS links to our dataset
for later crawling. By doing so, we identified 672 Chinese
HTTPS websites, with an average number of 15 HTTPS
pages per site. For the dataset of non-Chinese websites,
we found 1,601 HTTPS websites, with an average number
of 19 HTTPS pages per site. We summarize our findings
concerning HTTPS security issues and defense mechanisms
in Table 2.
The vast majority (84.1%) of Chinese HTTPS websites
have SSL/TLS implementation issues. More specifically,
13% of websites are using self-signed certificates, 19% have
insecure SSL 2.0 enabled, 30% support weak ciphers, and
18% and 33% are vulnerable to CRIME and SSL Renegoti-
ation attacks, respectively.
One can see that Chinese HTTPS websites tend to have
less problems with respect to post-to-HTTPS forms and
mixed-content inclusion, when comparing to the non-Chinese
HTTPS websites. Note, however, that we can not claim
that Chinese HTTPS websites are doing better than non-
Chinese HTTPS websites. Since 28% of Chinese HTTPS
websites have only one HTTPS webpage, the probability of
these issues occurring in Chinese websites is smaller than
on non-Chinese websites, which o↵er many more pages over
HTTPS.
As for the usage of client-side security policies on HTTPS
websites, we only found 8 websites using HSTS policies, and
206 websites having secure cookies. Interestingly, we noticed
that websites are more likely to enable other client-side se-
curity policies when they have HTTPS implemented. For
example, 69.8% of Chinese HTTPS website also make use of
HTTP-Only Cookies, a fraction much higher than the one
presented earlier in Table 1 (43%).
As for the distribution of HTTPS websites, we didn’t find
any strong correlation between a website’s popularity and
its adoption of HTTPS (as shown in Figure 1). To better
understand the Chinese websites using HTTPS, we cate-
gorized the 672 HTTPS websites, using McAfee’s Trusted-
Source Web Database [10]. The number of HTTPS websites
and the percentage of HTTPS websites having secure cook-
ies over the top 10 categories are presented in Figure 2. One
can see that, the financial websites are doing better than
websites in all other categories, with 110 financial websites
having HTTPS implemented, and about half of them using
secure cookies.
With only 6.7% of websites having HTTPS implemented,
the adoption rate of HTTPS on the Chinese web is much
lower, compared to the global statistic of 27% of the Alexa
top 1 million websites already used HTTPS in 2010 [24].
Although HTTPS is good for security, many websites are
reluctant to migrate to HTTPS, due to several concerns,
such as, SSL/TLS performance overhead, and operational
costs. Beside these common concerns shared by websites
globally, Chinese websites have to consider a China-specific
issue when deciding whether to adopt HTTPS, which is the
lack of HTTPS support from Baidu.
% of Non-Chinese
HTTPS websites
% of Chinese
HTTPS websites
Example findings
Insecure SSL/TLS
Implementation
70.9% 84.1% SSL 2.0 enabled, insecure renegotiation
(passport.baidu.com)
Post-to-HTTPS Forms 31.8% 21.4% http://wallet.tenpay.com/web (ten-
pay.com)
Mixed-content Inclusion 20.7% 10.6% https://login.xiu.com/ (xiu.com)
HSTS Policy 3.6% 1.3% max-age=31536000 (alipay.com)
Secure Cookies 19.9% 30.7% CAMToken=h4Kei5MyrK3DzSNmB
iVNr8skoJs=; Path=/; Secure
(hangseng.com.cn)
Table 2: Assessment overview for Chinese HTTPS websites
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Figure 2: Distribution of Chinese HTTPS websites over top 10 categories
As explained in Baidu’s o cial search engine optimization
(SEO) guide [3], Baidu does not have a good support for
HTTPS, thus Chinese websites are recommended to avoid
the use of HTTPS. If HTTPS is essential for a website, the
website should try to make the HTTPS webpages also avail-
able over HTTP, in order to get indexed by Baidu.
To further support our claim about Baidu’s partial lia-
bility for the low HTTPS adoption on the Chinese web, we
compare the search results from Baidu and Bing, for the
672 Chinese HTTPS websites. While we obtained about
2,000 HTTPS URLs for 296 (44%) HTTPS websites dur-
ing data collection with Bing Search API, we didn’t get any
HTTPS URLs from Baidu when using the same queries like
site:example.com to search for the popular webpages of
each HTTPS website.
4.4 Usage of KNET trusted website certificate
One of the benefits of implementing HTTPS is website au-
thenticity, which can help users to identify legitimate web-
sites and prevent some phishing attacks. With only 605
Chinese websites having HTTPS implemented, and 13% of
them using a self-signed certificate, it is challenging for Chi-
nese Internet users to identify phishing websites by checking
SSL certificates. In order to protect their users from phish-
ing attacks, many Chinese websites opt for a Chinese-specific
approach for website authentication by using trusted website
certificate issued by KNET (owned by CNNIC) [7].
KNET certifies a website based on its ICP license, reg-
istration information in industrial and commercial bureau,
and organization information. Certified websites are recorded
in the “National Trusted Site Database Open Platform”,
which is used by various client-side applications to help users
identify trusted websites. These applications include search
engines (Sogou, SOSO and Bing), browsers (Sougou, Max-
thon, Taobao, Ali, QQ and 114la), anti-virus software (Jin-
shan), and IE browser plugins. Considering the large amount
of phishing websites on the Chinese web [18], and the vari-
ous concerns about HTTPS implementations, we think that
using a trusted website certificate is a practical and e↵ec-
tive way for Chinese websites to defend themselves against
phishing attacks.
By querying the trusted site database, we found that only
21.8% (2,182) of the investigated Chinese website are using
KNET’s trusted website certificate. Similar to the distribu-
tion of HTTPS websites, certified trusted websites mostly
belong to categories such as government, business, finance,
and online shopping.
5. IDENTITY LEAKAGE
Online data leakage incidents are usually caused by cy-
ber attacks. For example, in December 2013, Chinese hack-
ers leaked over 20 million hotel reservation records contain-
ing customer information [1]. Careless or improper man-
Category #/% of websites #/% of files Example findings
Government 247 (41%) 1,592 (43.2%) List of candidates at Guangzhou bureau of
industry and commerce
(fi⇥ÂF@S¿ U) (gzaic.gov.cn)
Education 237 (39.3%) 1,543 (41.9%) List of registrants in Zhejiang University
(Y_'f• π U) (zju.edu.cn)
Others 119 (19.7%) 545 (14.9%) List of participants in racewalking
(fip&⌥[∫X U) (sport.org.cn)
Table 3: Distribution of websites leaking spreadsheet files containing ID numbers
agement of sensitive data, however, may also lead to in-
cidents. For instance, a Chinese university inadvertently
made 2,000 students’ identity numbers and bank accounts
available, through files located on their website [2]. In this
section, we investigate the issue of inadvertent data leak-
age. More specifically, we check whether a website is host-
ing spreadsheet files containing Chinese identity numbers
(henceforth ID numbers), that can be obtained simply via
search engines.
For each Chinese website in our dataset, we query both
Google and Baidu with “´˝¡(literally means ID card)
site:example.cn filetype:xls”in order to obtain the first
hundred search results. Then, for each result, we examine
the description part using regular expressions and the Chi-
nese ID checksum algorithm [31], in order to find valid ID
numbers. If the description part of a search result contains
a valid ID number, then we claim that the search result
(spreadsheet file) leaks private ID information. At the end
of this process, we found 2,496 spreadsheet files hosted on
548 websites through Google searches, and 1,422 spreadsheet
files hosted on 315 websites through Baidu searches.
In total, 3,680 spreadsheet files containing ID numbers
were found, located on 603 (6%) Chinese websites. After
categorizing these 603 websites, we found that the majority
of these files are hosted on governmental and educational
websites, as shown in Table 3. By examining the file names
and descriptions from the results of the two search engines,
we found that these spreadsheet files containing ID numbers
are typically used for announcing the results of various ac-
tivities, such as recruitment in government, enrollment in
universities, and awarding prizes and scholarships.
The issue of inadvertent data leakage when publishing
newsletters, is mainly due to the lack of privacy awareness
in Chinese organizations and the lack of legal protection for
private information in China. Although such inadvertent
mistakes are not malicious in nature, the leaked IDs can
be used by criminals for various illegal activities, such as
selling them to teenagers for online gaming registration (to
evade the anti-addiction system), using them for train ticket
scalping (a valid ID is required for buying train tickets on-
line), and operating malicious online shops with imperson-
ated identities.
Moreover, some leaked spreadsheet files also contain other
types of personal information such as phone numbers, occu-
pations and addresses. A motivated adversary can lever-
age all these private information to conduct social engineer-
ing attacks against related individuals, and subsequently
to launch targeted attacks against associated organizations.
For example, some leaked spreadsheet files contain recruit-
ment information for government, which could, in principal,
be used by advanced persistent threat actors [22] to attack
the Chinese government.
We consider this is a severe privacy issue on the Chinese
web. If an ID number or phone number must be made
available for identification or authentication, organizations
can straightforwardly mask some digits in the number (e.g.,
123456******1234 for an ID number, 138****1234 for a
phone number), in order to protect private information. Con-
sidering that the last digit of an ID number is a checksum, it
is better to also mask that digit (e.g., 12345619****567*) in-
stead of masking only 4 birthday digits (as used for printing
an ID number on a train ticket), in order to obtain higher
anonymity and prevent brute-forcing the ID number based
on the ID checksum algorithm.
To quantify websites that are using masked digits for pro-
tection, we also searched for masked ID numbers when ex-
amining results from search engines. In total, we found 83
websites using masked digits when publishing spreadsheet
files. Not surprisingly, 9 of them are financial websites, in-
cluding the big four Chinese banks. This shows that finan-
cial organizations put more e↵ort in protecting themselves
and their users.
6. RELATEDWORK
As the web becomes more complex and popular, security
and correctness become ever more crucial attributes of web
applications. A variety of methods and techniques have been
proposed to test web applications [21], and most of them are
designed to detect specific vulnerabilities and errors such as
SQL Injections and XSS attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that
attempts to analyze the security of the Chinese web from the
aspect of the adoption of defense mechanisms. Zhuge et al.
investigated China’s online black markets through structure
modeling and empirical analysis, showing that the size of the
Chinese underground economy is astonishing [20]. Alarifi et
al. presented a large-scale evaluation of popular Arabic web-
sites, by analyzing malicious webpages from 7,000 domains
using web scanner APIs like Google Safe Browsing [13]. An-
other regional web security assessment is presented in [27],
where the authors analyzed the malicious servers in the .nz
domain.
7. CONCLUSION
While the web gains more popularity in China, it is im-
portant for Chinese websites to identify their weaknesses
and adequately protect themselves. To this end, in this pa-
per, we present a security analysis of the top 10,000 Chinese
websites. By investigating the usage of client-side security
policies, and assessing the HTTPS implementations on the
Chinese web, we observed that the majority of websites lack
support for client-side security policies, and that the statis-
tics of vulnerable HTTPS implementations of Chinese web-
sites are also worrisome. Moreover, we found that 6% of
websites are leaking Chinese ID numbers through spread-
sheet files that can be obtained by simple searches in Google
and Baidu. We hope that our study can raise the security
and privacy awareness among Chinese Internet users, and
help Chinese websites to adopt client-side security policies
and implement HTTPS in a secure way.
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